"Old" Conflicts, New Solidarities
The current alliances between the Kurdish women's movement and feminist and women's organizations in Turkey have a long history of contention and disagreement that dates back to the early 1990s. These disagreements are rooted in Kurdish women's experiences of war and violence stemming from the hegemonic status of imagined Turkish nationhood. Feminists from Turkey 6 ask Kurdish women why they follow Abdullah Öcalan, a man, and why they ally themselves with Kurdish men. Kurdish women ask why feminists have long failed to acknowledge their suffering and marginalization and why they emphasize feminism as the only option for conducting women's politics. These questions were the basis of many major debates in the 1990s, 7 with Kurdish women focusing on their claim to be an autonomous women's movement and seeking acknowledgment from other women's and feminist groups. At the same time, while some Kurdish women activists define themselves as feminists, the Kurdish women's movement has often criticized feminism as a bourgeois ideology and a "minority movement," rather than a popular one. 8 These disagreements persisted in the years between 2013 to 2017, but they also evolved. They thus did not prevent feminist and women's organizations from engaging in new conversations and forming new solidarities around peace.
In the midst of these long-standing disagreements, the Kurdish women's movement began to play a significant role in the dissemination and practice of activism for peace and democracy in My observations suggest that women in Turkey and Kurdistan were not hopeful about the prospects for the peace process. A Kurdish woman activist in Diyarbakır told me that she was afraid that the peace process was a process of silence, and that silence usually ends with an "immense blow." Women's Strike. The demonstration featured not just these slogans, but also banners saying "NO,"
held by thousands of women at the march. This demonstration constituted a collective "NO" to the regime of emergency and authoritarianism, to the presidential system, and finally to the state's intervention in women's bodies and lives in Turkey. Ultimately, the April referendum resulted in a controversial "yes" vote, consolidating the rising authoritarianism and the emergency regime.
Women have now been left with no choice other than that of strengthening anti-state coalitions and solidarities. Now, women's slogan has become: by focusing on the global war on terror and its production of an "alternative system of justice." Gross, "What 'Emergency' Regime," 74. He suggests that "this alternate system of justice, rather than forming an exceptional 'emergency' regime, may be more accurately understood if we see it as an emerging new normality" (Ibid.). This emergency regime, as he points out, complicates "the relationship between normalcy and exception" (Ibid., 75). 2 March 8 is celebrated as International Women's Day in Turkey by feminist and women's groups, organizations, Kurdish women activists, LGBTQ+ people and groups, women from leftist political parties, and independent women and feminists. 3
Note that these peace negotiations date back to the 2009 Oslo talks between Turkish intelligence and the PKK, with the goal of a peace settlement in Turkey. In December 2012, the Prime Minister at the time, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, openly declared that peace talks were ongoing between Turkish intelligence and PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Thus began the "peace" or "resolution" process. 4
For further information on the "Kurdish opening," "democratic opening," or "peace process," The Kurdish women's movement considered the system of co-mayorship shared between a man and a woman to be an important step towards women's freedom, and women co-mayors had played a key role in local politics. 16 Democratic autonomy was one of the central demands of the Kurdish movement during the peace process.
The basic components of democratic autonomy can be defined as follows: (1) the democratization of Kurdish politics; (2) the creation of an alternative political model through the decentralization of state politics; (3) the reinforcement of local politics vis-à-vis the nation-state; and (4) the formation of a "democratic nation" and selfgovernance. 
